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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTA,H 
JESSE B. STONJ;~intiff Ed 1pplwnt, 
1
, l) ;,_ 
i~l ·' i -vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, A __ M_UNI~Gif:~It~-_- :. ·c·.:.~i::---~---­
CORPORA'TION; J. BRAC~"'EN .~-.tEE, 
JOE L. CHRISTENSEN, L. C. ROMNEY, 
T. I. GUERTS AND J. K. PIERCEY, ITS 
COMMISSIONERS; C HAM BE R OF 
COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
AND GUS P. BACKMAN, ITS SE.CRE-
TARY; ZIONS SECURITIES CORPO-
RATION, A ·CORPORATION; AND THE 
CORPORATION OF T·HE PRESIDENT 
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS ·CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, A CO·RPO-
RATION SOLE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9268 
APPEAL FRO~! THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
BRIEF OF CHAMBER OF COMMER·CE 
OF SALT LAKE CITY AND 
GUS P. BACKMAN, ITS SE·CRETARY, 
DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
FRED L. FINLINSON, 
FRANKLIN RITER, 
Attorneys for Respondents, 
Chamber of Commerce of 
Salt Lake City and Gus P. 
Backman, its Secretary 
Suite 822 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J~N~l1~ B. STONE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SAL1, LAl(I£ (jiTY, A ~l LJNI·CIP AL 
CORPORATION; J. BRACKEN LEE, 
JOI£ L. CHRISTJ£NSEN, L. C. R011NEY, 
T. I. GUEl-{'rS AND J. K. PIERCEY, ITS 
CO~ll\llSSIONERS; C H A 11 B E R O:B1 
C(J~l~l1 1~l{l1E OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
~\ND Gl~N P. BACI~2\[AN, ITS SECRE-
r~r.:\If1~; ZIOKH SECURITIES CORPO-
Hl\rriON, A COI~l~ORATION; AND THE 
C(>RPORATIOX OF THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE CHUI~CH OF JESUS ·CHRIST 
()F LATTER-DAY SAINTS, A CORP0-
1{~\TI()N SOLE, 




S·TATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff JESSE B. STONE was not, on the 
date of the comrnencernent of this action, and never has 
been, a rnember of the Chamber of Con1merce of Salt 
Lake ( 1it:·. The affidavit of Gus P. Baclunan, dated 
:Jiarch 9, 1960, attached to the motion of these respond-
ents to disrniss plaintiff's cornplaint, proves this fact. 
The appellant does not controvert the same. 
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2. The applicants, FAUSETT, "'ere not on the 
date of their application to intervene, and never have 
been 1nembers of the ·Charnber of Con1n1erce of Salt Lake 
City. The affidavit of Gus P. Back1nan, dated ~larch 
30, 1960, proves this fact. Appellant does not controvert 
the same. 
ARGl~.JlE~'r O:B--, l{l£~PU~DE~'fS 
Cl-IA1fBl~R OF CO~li\lERCE OE, ~ALT LAl{J~ CITY 
.A.ND G L~ P. BACK.JLA.N, ITS ~E(;RETARY 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AND REFUSING TO 
ALLOW 'fHE APPLICANTS, FAUSETT, TO INTER-
VENE THEREIN INSOFAR AS THE CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY AND GUS P. 
BACKMAN, ITS SECRETARY, ARE CONCERNED, 
IS CORRECT FOR THE REASON THAT SAID 
PLAINTIFF NEVER HAS HAD ANY PRESENT 
SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THE CONTROVERSY, NOR HAS HE 
EVER POSSESSED A LEGAL STATUS AUTHOR-
IZING HIM TO PROSECUTE SAID CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
The defendant and re~pondent, Charnber of Conl-
rnerce of Salt Lake City, is a corporation. organized and 
existing under the non-profit corporation la"Ts of the 
~tate of l Ttah. According to it~ arti~les of incorporation, \ 
its principal purpose H~hall be to prornote the general 
\\'elfare of the City and County of Salt Lake in the 
State of Utah; to engage and assist in social relief 'York 
therein and to earr~T on such other and related activitie8 
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as are ordinary and nor1nall y enbo·aaed in by Cha1nbers 
<I "' b 
of Conuuer~e." Gus 1>. Baclunan \Vas at the tilne of the 
occurrence of the ineidents related in plaintiff's coin-
plaint and also at the time of the corn1nencement of thi~ 
action, the executive secretary of said (;harnber of (;oln-
tnerce. It is apparent fron1 the plaintiff's complaint that 
he \\·as 1nade a defendant in this action only because of 
the fact that he ,,·as the executive secretary of said cor-
poration. Therefore, it is proper to treat in this argu-
lnent the ·Cha1nber of Co1nrnerce and Backrnan as a unit. 
The Cha1nber of Con1merce has no stockholders; it 
only has members. The non-profit corporation la,vs of 
Litah contemplate such situation (Sees. 16-6-1, 16-6-12, 
L~tah Code Ann. 1953). 
Rule 17 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in part as follows : 
~'Every action shall be prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest*****." 
The "'real party in interest" is the party who by 
substantive la\\T possesses the right sought to be enforced 
and not necessarily the persons ,,·ho will ultimately bene-
fit fro1n the recovery. Therefore, the question, who is 
the real party in interest, is governed by the substantive 
la\\~. HThe real party in interest'' provision applies to 
all suits including class actions (2 Barron and Holtzoff, 
Section -±82, Page 5). 
H In considering the proper person to insti-
tute a judicial proceeding one should bear in mind 
the fundamental principle that courts are insti-
tuted to afford relief to persons \vhose rights 
have been invaded, or are threatened \vith inva-
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sion, by the defendant's acts or conduct, and to 
give relief at the instance of such persons; a 
court may and IJroperly should refuse to enter-
tain an action at the instance of one whose rights 
have not been invaded or infringed, as where he 
seeks to invoke a rernedy in behalf of another "'~ho 
seeks no redress. One cannot rightfully invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court to enforce private 
rights or 1naintain a civil action for the enforce-
Inent of such rights unless he has in an individual 
or representative capacity son1e real interest in 
the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, 
title, or interest in the subject matter of the 
controversy. To enable one to maintain an action 
to enforce private rights, he must sho'v that he 
has sustained son1e injury to his personal or 
property rights. The principle that one "\Yithout 
pecuniary intere~t has no judicial standing runs 
throughout our jurisprudence, and unless one has 
some re1nedial interest he cannot be a party plain-
tiff. His interest must be a present, substantial 
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, 
or future, contingent interest, and he 1nust sho'v 
that he '"ill be benefited by the relief granted." 
( 39 A1n. J ur. - Parties, Sec. 10, Pages 859, 860). 
Stone and the Faucetts have neYer been 1ne1nber~ of 
the Chamber of Con11nerce. ,.Vith respect to this corpora-
tion they possess no substantive rights to Yindirate in 
this aetion. '\'"hen Stone na1ned the Chan1ber of Co1n-
1nerce a party defendant in the~e proceeding~. he "\Yas 
an interloper and '"as a 1neddler in 1natters "Thich "\Yere 
none of his business. The Fauc~tt~ by their application 
to intPrvene, '"ere also interlopers and 1neddler~. The 
actions of the Chan1ber of Co11nnerce "\Yere none of their 
concern. The test as to ,,~hether Stone or the Faucetts 
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"~ere ""real parties in intere:::;t ~, is: ( 1) 'vhether they are 
O\Vners of rights to be enforced; or (2) "·hether they 
are in a position to release and discharge the Cha1nber 
of Conunerce fro1n the liability upon 'vhich the action is 
grounded. (Regan vs. Dougherty, 40 :N .~1. -±39, G2 Pac. 
(2d) 810). This rule is also "\Veil illustrated in the case 
of State e.r. rel. Hays, et al L'~. Wil~on, 17 v\'"ash. (2nd) 
670, 137 Pac. ( 2d) 105, where the Court \Vrote: 
~·The order dismissing the action must be 
affirrned in conforrnity to the rule that to enable 
one to maintain a cause of action to enforce pri-
vate rights, he rnust sho'v that he has some real 
interest in the cause of action.'' 
The Supren1e Court of t;tah in the case of Slunv us. 
Jeppson, 121 l~tah 155, 239 Pacific (2d) 7-+3, clearly 
demonstrated exactly 'vhat is 1neant by a ·'real party 
in interest." In the course of its opinion it said: 
"The reason the defendant has the right to 
have a cause of action prosecuted l;~r the real 
party in interest, is so that the judgment will 
preclude any action on the sarne de1nand by an-
other and permit the defendant to assert all de-
fenses or counterclai1ns available against the real 
o\vner of the cause.'' 
It is apparent in this instance that since neither 
Stone nor the Fausetts possess any interest in the 
Chamber of ·Commerce by way of membership to be 
protected or vindicated by this action, that a judgment 
in favor of the Chamber of Con1merce in this action 
will not shield it against the clain1 of a real and true 
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The general rule is that the question of '\Thether a 
corporation has acted in excess of it;::; la,vful powers can 
only be raised by one interested therein, or dealing 'vith 
the corporation, or in a direct proceeding brought by 
the State authority to forfeit the charter or to subject 
it to punislunent for the unla\\Tful act (13 An1. Jur. -
Corporations, Sec. 759, Page 790). One "Those rights are 
not injuriou;::;ly affected cannot eo1nplain that a corpora-
tion has acted in excess of its po,vers (Denver Po\'.Ter and 
Irrigation Co1npany vs. Denver and Rio Grande Rail-
road Co., 30 Colo. 204, 69 Pac. 568, 60 LRA 383). A 
case very much in point is that of Jones us. San Bernar-
dino Real Estate Board, et al, 168 Cal. .1\p. (2d) 661, 
336 Pacific ( 2d) 606, "rherein it 'vas held that a non-
member of a real estate building board association, a 
non-profit corporation, cannot clain1 da1nages fron1 the 
Association, nor could any liability in favor of the non-
rnember be in1posed upon the .1:\.~~ociation. The illegal 
acts of the corporation cannot be attacked except by 
one 'vhose right~ have been invaded. (Belfast vs. Belfast 
Water Co., 98 Atlantic (~laine) 738,) L.R .. A .. 1917 B. 
908; Memphis and C. R. Co. vs. Grayson, 88 .1:\.la. 37:2, 
7 South 122.; Burns 1)S. St. Paul C·ity Railzray C1o., 101 
Minn. 263, 11:2 N.\\". 412; f.lezr Orleans. etc. R. Conzpany 
vs. Ell ernuuz, 105 tT .S. 16G, 2G L. Ed. 1013: ]\T eu· England 
R. Co. vs. Central R. and Ellectric Co., G9 ·Conn. 3(), 36 
Atlantic. 1061.) 
The principles of la\v herein set forth de1nonstrate 
that neither ~tone nor the Faucetts haYe any standing 
in Court to question the legality of the actions of the 
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Cha1nber of Counuerce or Back1nan its executive secre-
' tary, with respect to the acquisition by the United States 
of A1nerica of the site for the proposed new ~,ederal 
Building. 
Appellant cites Rule 19, of the utah Rules of {jivil 
Procedure as authority for the proposition that ~~persons 
having a joint interest shall be utade parties and be 
joined on the saute side as plaintiffs or defendants*****," 
and Appellant further quotes from Shields vs. Barron, 17 
Howard 130, 139, 15 L. Ed. 158, 161 to the effect that: 
HPersons who not only have an interest in 
the controversy but an interest of such a nature 
that a final decree cannot be made 'vithout either 
affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy 
in such a condition that it~ final termination 1nay 
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good con-
science are indispensable parties." 
Appellant, therefore, concludes that "the Cha1nber 
of ·Con1merce cannot be eliminated frou1 the contract 
(sic) as there 'vould be no one before the court with 
'vhon1 the City has a contract.'' 
The fallacy of Appellant's argument that the Cham-
ber of Conunerce and its executive secretary, Backman, 
are indispensable parties to this action lies in the as-
sulnption that Stone and the Faucetts are in the legal 
position to litigate the validity of the actions of the 
Cha1nber of Commerce and Back1nan. \V ere they 1nembers 
in good standing of the Chamber of Counnerce, this 
argument 1night have validity. Stone and the Faucetts 
are strangers to the Chamber of ·Commerce and their 
institution of this litigation against the Chantber of 
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Comn1erce and its executive secretary, \\·ere gratuitou.; 
acts of interlopers. To state the Inatter in figurative 
language, Stone is a trespasser in the precincts of the 
(;hainber of Connnerce. The J udg1nent of the r~I'rial Court 
evicted hin1. The Faucetts atten1pted to gain ad1nission 
to these precincts but the Judgment of the trial court 
barred their entrance. Xeither Stone nor the Faucett::; 
are in a position to test the question, '\Thether the Chain-
her of Com1nerce and Backman are indispensable parties. 
Let a bona fide Inember of the Cha1nber of ·Connnerce 
co1ne for,\rard and he n1ay be able to reach this question, 
but Stone and the Faucetts cannot. 
There "\Vas no error in the Judgn1ent of the trial 
court in dismissing Stone's first cause of action and re-
fusing to admit the Fausetts to the litigation. 
POINT II. 
THE APPLICANTS, FAUSETT, WERE NOT 
ENTITLED TO INTERVENE IN PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION INSOFAR AS IT IN-
VOLVED THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF 
SALT LAKE CITY AND GUS P. BACKMAN, ITS 
SECRETARY, FOR THE REASON mAT SAID 
FAUSETTS NEVER HAVE HAD ANY PRESENT 
SUBSTA·NTIAL INTEREST IN THE CONTRO-
VERSY, NOR HAVE THEY EVER POSSESSED A 
LEGAL STATUS WHICH PERMITTED THEM TO 
INTERVENE. 
These Respondent~ havp de1non~trated under Point 
I. that the Fausetts \\Tere not entitled to intervene in 
this aetion and therefore the refusal of the trial court 
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I 
I I 
to consider their application to intervene '"a~ not error . 
.No further argun1ent i~ necessary in support of thi~ 
point. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION AND REFUSING TO ALLOW THE APPLI-
CANTS, FAUSETT, TO INTERVENE THEREIN IN-
SOFAR AS THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF 
SALT LAKE CITY AND GU,S P. BACKMAN, ITS 
SECRETARY, ARE CONCERNED, WAS CORRECT 
FOR THE REASON THAT SAID DEFENDANTS 
AND RESPONDENTS NEVER HAVE BEEN CON-
NECTED IN ANY RESPECT WITH THE SUBJECT 
OF THE CONTROVERSY. 
The allegations of plaintiff's second cau~e of action 
\viii be searched in vain for any mention of the Chan1ber 
of ·Co1nmerce of Salt Lake City and of it:::; executive 
secretary, Bacla:nan. The reason for the silence of plain-
tiff as to the Chamber of Co1n1nerce of Salt Lake City 
and Backman, its executive secretary, is the fact that 
neither of the1n \vas in any respect connected \vith the 
alleged transaction concerning the Forest Dale Golf 
Course to which this cause of action relates. Insofar as 
these defendants are concerned, this cause of action 
should have been striken. They \Yere never connected 
"~ith the subject of the controver~y and plaintiff does 
not pretend that they had any part in it. There was 
certainly no error in the judg1nent of the court which 
dis1nissed this cause of action as to these respondents. 
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WlfEREFORE, these Respondents respectfully sub-
mit that the judg1nent, as the sa1ne affect~ then1, should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
FRED L. FIKLINSON, 
FRANKLIN RITER, 
Suite 822 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for I-lespondents, 
Chamber of Commerce of 
Salt Lake City and Gus P. 
Backman, its Secretary 
10 
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